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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Spring

knew that the plans and specifications had been drawn by architects. The
court of appeals, in affirming the trial court's judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, stated that where a contract is silent in regard to a matter of so
much importance to both parties it is not to be presumed that it was intended to imply an agreement upon that point, and that in the absence of
such implication the plaintiffs were only required under their contract to
perform their work in the common and usual manner at the place where
the work was done- which the trial court found that the plaintiffs had
done.
ROBRT C. BENSING

CORPORATIONS
The cases in this field deal with a variety of problems ranging from the
rights of a shareholder in an Ohio building and loan association which has
voted to convert to a federal savings and loan association to the liability of
a successor corporation for the debts of its predecessor.'
In Opdyk,- v. Secwrity Savwngs & Loan Co.2 the Ohio Supreme Court
dealt with the rights of dissatisfied shareholders who objected to the conversion of a local building and loan association into a federal savings and
loan association. The plaintiff stockholders asked that the conversion be
enjoined and in the alternative that they be given the fair cash value of their
shares. In denying the shareholders' claims, the court concluded that Sections 693-1, 8623-15, 8623-15a, 8623-63 and 9665 of the Ohio General
Code, regarding dissolutions, amendment of articles and the sale of the
entire assets of a corporation, did not limit the right of an Ohio building
and loan association to convert into a federal savings and loan associatAon
pursuant to Section 9660-2 of the Ohio General Code. The court also construed a limitation on the right of dissolution in the articles of association
'A related problem regarding proper parties in suits against unincorporated associations was considered by the Ohio Supreme Court in Damm v. Elyria Lodge, 158
While the major emphasis of this case
Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952)
is on the capacity of the wife to sue the husband in tort (which is discussed elsewhere in this survey), the capacity of the wife to sue an unincorporated association
of which her husband is a member is involved. After determining that the sections of the code defining the rights of the husband and wife and those granting a
married woman the right to "sue and be sued as if she were unmarried" abolished
the common law doctrine of the legal identity of the husband and wife, the court
held that the action could be maintained against the association even though the
plaintiff's husband and all other members thereof were brought in by representation as parties. OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 8002-1 et seq., 12245. See 4 WEST. RES. L
Rav.83 (1952).
'157 Ohio St. 121, 105 N.E.2d 9 (1952)
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as applicable only to the statutory powers described in Section 9665 of the
General Code, and as not applicable to the exercise of a power to convert
into a federal savings and loan association pursuant to provisions of Section 9660-2.
In addition, the supreme court held that the right of a dissenting stockholder to receive the fair cash value of his shares is strictly a statutory right
which the General Assembly has sometimes provided in the event of certain
major corporate changes for the purpose of protecting the rights of minority stockholders. No such provision has been made in a case of conversion
from a state to a federal savings and loan association; and, accordingly, a
dissenting shareholder has no right to a fair cash value for his shares where
the conversion takes place pursuant to Section 9660-2 of the Ohio General
Code.3
In Leyman Co. v. Piggly-Wiggly Corp.4 the court of appeals held that
an unknown creditor of a corporation which had sold all of its assets to the
defendant corporation and then dissolved could hold the defendant liable
on this obligation. It appeared that the defendant had undertaken to assume
every obligation of whatever nature or description owing by the former
company. Two theories were used by the court. First, the court looked
upon this understanding between the defendant and the former company as a
third-party beneficiary contract which was designed for the plaintiff's benefit. Secondly, the defendant, because it had taken possession of and ttle
to all the assets of the Piggly-Wiggly Stores, Inc. without payment therefore, became a constructive trustee of the assets for the benefit of all those
having enforceable claims against the former company.
Economy Drug Co.,, the court of appeals conIn Mayer v. Cinctnatn
sidered the perennial problem of a stockholder's right to inspect the books
of the corporation and construed the phraseology "save and except for unreasonable or improper purposes" found in Section 8623-63 of the Ohio
General Code. The court decided that under the circumstances of this
particular case there was no "improper purpose." It pointed out that there
is a presumption that the demand for inspection was made in good faith
and followed the rule announced in William Coale Development Co. v.
Kennedy" .that the burden of going forward with the evidence on the
'The dissent, which took the position that the legislation authorizing the conversion
abdicates legislative power and leaves all the applicable law regarding the conversion
to enactments by Congress and the rules and regulations of federal agencies, relied
upon Cleveland v. Piskura, 145 Ohio St. 144, 60 N.E.2d 919 (1945) and contended
that this legislation was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the
federal government.
' 90 Ohio App. 506, 103 N.E.2d 399 (1951).
'89 Ohio App. 512, 103 N.E.2d 1 (1951).
'121 Ohio St. 582, 170 N.E. 434 (1930).

